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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
BENNY SALAZAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

-vs-

JOHN ,V. TURNER, WARDEN,
UTAH STATE PRISON,

Case No.

12803 .

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the trial
court dismissing appellant's Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COUR'.f
Appellant's Petition for a W1·it of Habeas Corpus
was denied after an evidentiary hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
lower court denying his Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
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STATEl\fENT OF FACTS
On November 16, 1971, the appellant filed a complaint and petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. At
the hearing it was the appellant's main coutention that
he was denied effective aid of counsel at the proceedings held in connection with a second degree burglary
charge that was handled in September of 1966. The
testimony of the appellant at the time of his hearing
was that he did not understand the nature of the proceedings because he had insufficient knowledge of the
English language and was not aided by an interpreter.
The appellant further testified that he made unsuccessful requests of his attorney to obtain the services of an
interpreter. ( T. 7 and 9)
The appellant's confusion and inability to understand is generally demonstrated throughout his testimony at the hearing and more particularly demonstrated
by his ignorance as to whether or not he entered a plea
of guilty or was tried and convicted. (T. 10-12)
The testimony of appellant's appointed counsel at
the time of his second degree burglary charge was inconclusive since he had no speci fie recollection of the
case except to recognize the face of the appellant. (T.
17) The appointed counsel further testified that he had
no record or file on the appellant and probably represented the appellant on the spur of the moment at the
request of the court. ( T. 21)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
GRANTING THE APPELLANT'S PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ON THE
GROUNDS THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
INEFFECTIVELY AIDED BY COUNSEL
FOR HIS FAILURE TO OBTAIN AN INTERPRETER TO INSURE THAT THE APPELLANT UNDERSTOD EACH STAGE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS.
It has been conceded by the State that an interpretor was not provided to appellant at the time of the
proceedings on the second degree burglary charge in
1966. The only issues to be resolved is whether the appellant sufficiently demonstrated at his habeas corpus
hearing that he needed one and assuming he did need
one whether the failure of his attorney to retain one
would constitute grounds for granting the writ.

It is submitted that the record as a whole demonstrates the appellant's ignorance and lack of understanding of the English langauge. The habeas corpus
hearing was held more than five years from the day
the appellant entered his guilty plea to second degree
burglary. It is evident from reading the transcript that
the appellant was not able to understand his own at'orney during direct examination at the habeas corpus
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hearing and probably should have been provided with
the services of an interpreter at that time.
Even though the testimony of the appellant's appointed counsel is inconclusive because of his lack of
recall, there are portions of his testimony which would
strongly indicate that the whole proceedings were
handled in a summary manner. The fact that the appellant's appointed attorney had no file or record of the
case would certainly lend support to his statement that:
". . .it was on the spur of the moment that I
was in court and probably was requested to
represent this individual, and without further
notice except the negotiations with the district
attorney and that they arrive at him pleading
guilty on a charge of second degree burglary."
(T. 21)
If the matter was disposed of as above described,
the defendant's testimony concerning his lack of understanding and communications would certainly appear
to be creditable.
It is recogized that a defendant's inability to communicate with his attorney may be a significant factor
in determining whether or not he was denied effective
assistance of counsel. Cervantes v. Cox, 350 Fed 855
(1965). In the case of Parra v. Page, 430 P.2d 834
( 1967), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
minutes and record must show that the defendant understood what was taking place during the court pro-
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ceedings when his knowledge of the English language
is limited. The Pm·ra case involving an un-educated
Mexican-American migrant worker is very similar to
the instant case not only because of the language difficulties but also because of the summary manner in
which it was handled. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
in Vol. 430 P2d on page 873 stated:
The minutes of the instant case do not reveal
that petitioner was provided with these f undamental rights which guarantee a fair and impartial trial. His attorney was appointed on
the day of the arraignment, according to the
minutes, and could not possibly have had time
to check into the facts of the case, or to determine whether petitioner had a meritorious
defense, before entering a plea of guilty.
The testimony of the defendant's appointed attorney and State's Exhibit 1 would lead to the conclusion
that the instant case was handled in a summary manner
as above described by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a
language barrier exists it is the duty of the trial court
on its own motion to appoint an interpreter. State v.
Kariima, 126 P.2d 1047 101 Utah 444 (1942); State v.
Vasquez, 101Utah444121P.2d903 (1942).
In a recent case involving an immigrant to the
United States from Puerto Rico the United States District Court in the State of New York held that there
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is an obligation upon the state court to adYise a person
with a language barrier, that if he so desires, he is entitled to a court-appointed interpreter. United States of
America ex rel Rogelio Nieves Negron v. New York,
310 Fed Supp. 1304 ( 1970).
The following language on page 1308 of the
Negron case indicates the importance of the issue involved in the instant case.
. . . the rudimentary demands of a fair trial
required that his Sixth Amendment rights to
confrontations and effective assistance of coun. sel be preserved during the trial. .Tohnson v.
Zebst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed.
1461, ( 1938). This, of course, was impossible
if Negron did not know what was said against
him and was unable to properly confer with
his attorney.
. . . From the teachings of People v. Annett,
251 Cal App2d 858, 59 Cal Rptr. 888 ( 1967)
cert denied; Q.ideon v. Ul.ainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) and
Griffin v. People of the State of Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 ( 1956),
it follows that it was the duty of the state to
provide Negron with a Spanish interpreter,
if he so desired, and to advise him of his right
in advance of trial.
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The case at bar never reached the trial level, nevertheless, it would appear equally important that an interpreter be appointed at the arraignment stage of the
proceedings particularly when a plea of guilty is taken.

CONCLUSION
On the face of the record and on the basis of the
cases cited by the appellant, it is submitted that the appellant is entitled to the relief sought on the writ of
habeas corpus.
Respectfully submitted,

LYNN R. BROWN

Attorney for Appellant

